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Speelman and McGann’s (2013) examination of the uncritical way in which the mean
is often used in psychological research raises questions both about the average’s
reliability and its validity. In the present paper, we argue that interrogating the validity
of the mean involves, amongst other things, a better understanding of the person’s
experiences, the meaning of their actions, at the time that the behavior of interest is
carried out. Recently emerging approaches within Psychology and Cognitive Science
have argued strongly that experience should play a more central role in our examination
of behavioral data, but the relationship between experience and behavior remains very
poorly understood. We outline some of the history of the science on this fraught
relationship, as well as arguing that contemporary methods for studying experience fall
into one of two categories. “Wide” approaches tend to incorporate naturalistic behavior
settings, but sacrifice accuracy and reliability in behavioral measurement. “Narrow”
approaches maintain controlled measurement of behavior, but involve too specific a
sampling of experience, which obscures crucial temporal characteristics. We therefore
argue for a novel, mid-range sampling technique, that extends Hurlburt’s descriptive
experience sampling, and adapts it for the controlled setting of the laboratory. This
controlled descriptive experience sampling may be an appropriate tool to help calibrate
both the mean and the meaning of an experimental situation with one another.
Keywords: averages, qualitative methods, mixed-methods, phenomenology, validity
INTRODUCTION: TWO COMPLEMENTARY CHALLENGES
It is something of a trite observation amongst psychologists that not everything that matters can
be measured. While a truism, any good psychologist also takes this as a challenge. We are aware,
sometimes painfully so, of the limitations of our methods, and the complexity of our subject matter.
But good science uses a range of techniques that complement one another and allows us to piece
together a multiplex but increasingly coherent understanding of the mind and behavior. While
some things cannot be measured, they can be observed and analyzed in rigorous and systematic
ways that acknowledge and work within the boundaries of valuable data collection.
Our statistics are part of this toolbox of various methods that we use to build an understanding
of psychology. Speelman and McGann (2013) reviewed a number of limitations of the mean as
a representation of varied measurements, and the kinds of research designs built around their
analysis. Their aim in doing so was not to be pessimistic about the possibility of accurate or valid
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measurement in psychological science, but to prompt a
discussion on the ways in which means or averages have been
used uncritically and how their use might be improved as part
of a wider effort to sharpen research practices in the discipline.
Speelman and McGann (2013) suggest no single means of
improving care or practice with regards to the mean. Rather, a
critical attitude that keeps theoretical assumptions in sight and
reinforces an awareness of the derived nature of the mean (as
opposed to it being assumed a measurement of an underlying
parameter) is suggested. Mathematical and methodological
techniques help refine the reliability of averages, helping to
improve our confidence that an average indicates something
important and stable about the data that have been collected. But
we must also use varied methodological techniques to critically
examine the validity of those data.
Speelman and McGann (2013) identify a number of
assumptions in play in common use of the mean to summarize
performance by an individual or group on a given task. The
mean is typically used as an estimate of a “true” value being
measured, with variability around that mean being a result of
noise or other independent variables unrelated to those addressed
in the experiment at hand. There are surely many cases where
these assumptions hold true, but Speelman and McGann (2013)
note that we should also be prepared to test these assumptions as
a matter of common good practice.
We should be sensitive to the possibility that variability around
the mean may have something important to tell us about the
value of that statistic, and we are in need of techniques that allow
us to interrogate such variations. Paying attention to variation
in task performance could potentially enable us to validate our
measurements, reinforce our interpretations, while also giving
us a chance to spot new relevant variables, or other forms of
confound.
Part of these efforts after validity involves the use of varied data
gathering techniques, making a range of observations that might
allow new information to come to the fore, and providing insights
into patterns of behavior that might otherwise go unnoticed.
Each variable noticed can potentially be isolated, measured,
and its contribution to a given set of performances teased
apart through experimental or statistical control – in essence
refining the mean being measured, distilling out the particular
variable of interest from a complex mixture. There are some
variables that have proven very difficult to quantify, isolate,
and control, despite there being clear evidence that they play a
role in how a person reacts to the task, materials, or situation
of our laboratory experiments. In particular, the experience of
the situation for participants, what the task or actions involved
mean for them as they carry out the task, is something that
tends to see little systematic analysis in experimental research,
but has been increasingly recognized in recent years (Barrett
et al., 2010, 2011). In the rest of the current paper we outline
some prima facie reasons why a participant’s experience of the
laboratory and the apparent meaning of the task for them
should be taken seriously. We then review some of the reasons,
both historical and scientific, why the systematic collection
of data concerning participants’ experience remains relatively
rare.
We thus outline two challenges that we suggest are somewhat
complementary. On the one hand, the use of the mean in
empirical studies demands a set of practices that police its
validity. On the other, understanding the meaning of a situation
requires the collection of remarkably difficult data – experiential
reports – that are quintessentially un-averageable. If we are
to test and refine the validity of our data, we will need to
be able to find some way of examining variation in measured
performance that might fit or diverge from variation in observed
experiences. We review a number of different techniques for
collecting experiential data and argue that, while useful in their
current form, could yet be refined to provide us a more effective
means of validating and calibrating measurements in laboratory
behavioral experiments. While mixed methods approaches are
becoming increasingly prevalent (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2010),
and have been deployed in a wide range of settings (REFS), we
suggest that there remains a need for a new form of research
method that more closely allies standard laboratory experiments
with the collection of reports of participants’ specific experiences
of those experiments.
VALIDITY, EXPERIENCE, AND
EXPERIMENTAL CONTROL
Assessing the validity of our measures is made difficult by the
fact that it cannot be achieved via a single method. Though
we might have a perfectly reliable measure, certainty regarding
what it is that we are actually measuring comes not from the
consistency of its numbers, but from our understanding of
the tool and the ways in which it is used. The understanding
that is vital to validity comes from approaching the same
phenomenon from other angles, using other methods. No
measurement is pure and no experiment perfect, but over time
and through the convergence of multiple points of view we
gradually develop a picture of our subject matter in increasingly
fine resolution. Where validity of the mean, in particular, is
concerned, we will need several complementary studies of a
behavioral phenomenon that make it clear it is reliable, and
insofar as the meaning or experience of the situation is one
of the things that cause it to vary, that we sample those as
appropriate.
Decades of research in Psychology have taught us that in
the experiments where we make our measurements, meaning
matters a great deal. Meaning has been on the agenda in
some form or another since the “New Look” studies of Bruner
and colleagues, which played a substantial role in the rise of
cognitive psychology. Bruner and Goodman (1947) reported
that coins were perceived or remembered as having different
sizes depending on the economic status of the person doing the
perceiving, while Bruner and Postman (1949) showed error and
expectancy effects due to prior experience and understanding
of decks of playing cards. Bruner (1990) has since distanced
himself from the computationalist understanding of the mind
that developed in part from this line of work on perception, but
maintains that understanding the role of meaning in psychology
is vital if we are to advance the science, advancing a theory of
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 May 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 674
fpsyg-07-00674 May 5, 2016 Time: 16:44 # 3
McAuliffe and McGann Meaning and the Mean
meaning as culturally enacted but still constitutive of cognitive
activity.
The classic work of Treisman (1960), still cited in introductory
texts to cognitive psychology, illustrated how people’s attention
often moves fluidly with the meaning of the stimuli they are being
exposed to, rather than the particular sensory channel on which
they were supposed to be focusing. While such research as the
New Look and experiments on attention made it clear that the
meaning of the stimuli matter for so-called “lower level” aspects
of cognition, decades of research were triggered when Wason
(1971) showed that it affects reasoning too. People reason to
different inferences depending on whether the material they were
working with were meaningful to them – whether the materials
fit a person’s general experience of the world – or whether they
were abstract and contrived.
Perhaps more pointedly, research on participants’ experience
of psychological research itself highlights the potency of
a situation’s apparent meaning for people’s behavior. Since
Orne’s (1962) exploration of demand characteristics, we have
been sensitive to the fact that participants who interpret the
experiment as testing a particular hypothesis tend to skew their
behavior (either deliberately or unconsciously) to support or
undermine the perceived hypothesis. Orne (1973) argued that
people respond to the “total experimental situation” and that a
range of steps should be taken to cope with the rather holistic
nature of the setting influencing people. Orne’s work itself
developed within a context of increasing disciplinary recognition
that the stimulus materials were only part of the picture in
understanding behavior in psychology experiments.
Rosenberg (1969) reported three conditions of a study
in which participants were asked how much they liked or
disliked various pictured persons. Both groups were informed
that past research indicated that liking–disliking reactions to
strangers correlated with maturity. One group were told that
psychologically mature and healthy individuals show greater
liking for strangers than immature people and were given
fabricated journal article citations. The other experimental group
were told the opposite – that research indicated that immaturity
was associated with greater liking of strangers, with fabricated
journal articles cited. Both groups, however, were informed
that they were not going to take part in a study of liking–
disliking images of strangers, but rate pictures of strangers to
create a standardized list of photographs. Participants believed
that these photographs were then going to be used in a liking–
disliking task in future research. It isn’t surprising that there
were significant differences between the groups, but the obvious
manipulation here is not the full story. Rosenberg’s work is a
clear illustration of evaluation apprehension, which can be made
to affect experimental responding. However, Rosenberg also
included a control group with no information about maturity and
liking. The results indicated that male participants in this neutral
context condition rated male pictures much lower than both
experimental groups. They even rated the images substantially
lower than the group that were informed that lower ratings was
associated with maturity.
Expectancy, social desirability, and demand effects within
psychological research are all indications that what participants
are doing is not naively fixed by the explicit instructions
presented to them, but richly enmeshed with the meaning of
the context as a whole. The average response to a given task or
stimulus is a product not of a single fix instruction set, but a varied
participant-lab situation.
More subtly, work by Gallagher and Marcel (1999) with
patients with dyspraxia indicates how their performance on a
given task varies substantially with its meaningfulness. Very
similar bodily movements that are difficult or impossible for
a patient in clinical assessment might be performed relatively
smoothly and effectively in situations where the context is more
meaningful for them. Lifting a cylindrical object from a table
might be a challenge, but taking a drink of water from a tumbler
straightforward. Touching their nose on demand can be difficult,
but pushing their glasses back into position is done without pause
for thought.
More recently we have seen a renewed surge in interest in
context, and how it is defined not just by the stipulations of the
experimenter but by the total situation involving the thoughts,
feelings and behaviors of a particular person, at a particular time
(Barrett et al., 2010, 2011; Schwarz, 2010). The experience of the
participant and the meaning of the situation for them is once
again being acknowledged and given a central role in how we
consider their behavior. If we are to adequately understand what
a person does, so the understanding goes, we cannot just examine
the “input”, the stimuli used, the wording of instructions, or the
logical details of the task in which the person was engaged. The
validity of our measures is derived from the whole situation and
should be examined within the context of that whole situation –
including their own experience of it. Though there is no claim
that this is all that matters, this is one facet of the complexity
of a laboratory situation affecting the value and variability of
measurements made in that situation, and which should be
included as a consideration when policing the validity of those
measurements across replications.
Several related threads of theoretical and empirical work
share this concern with experience. They tend to vary, however,
in terms of their descriptions of the relationships between
experience and behavior (Thompson, 2007; Di Paolo, 2009;
Shapiro, 2010; Wilson and Golonka, 2013) though most
commonly the specifics of that relationship remain ill-defined.
There are thus long threads of research through the history
of experimental psychology, including many that have become
increasingly influential in recent years, that make a strong case
for including some account of the participants’ experience of
the experiment in our analyses and interpretation of the data
(or at least some aspects of the data). Swinging against this
trend, however, is one with an even longer history within the
discipline pointing to the weaknesses and unreliability of people’s
description of their own thoughts and behavior.
Good Reasons to Distrust Experiential
Reports
While it is clear that people’s experience matters to their behavior,
more than a century of research has shown us that it is difficult
to understand just how it matters. Scientific psychology had
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the examination of consciousness at its core during the period
when all of its major institutions were founded. However, several
decades of the analysis of experience ground to a halt in the
face of difficulties with introspection. The difficulties of shared
analysis, the challenges of independent testing, and the existence
of unfalsifiable claims, all made consciousness a problematic
notion for a burgeoning science (Watson, 1913; Fancher, 1996;
Richards, 2002).
Experience was marginalized by most forms of behavioristic
psychology that dominated research through the middle half of
the twentieth century. When interest arose again in latter decades,
much of the research showed that what effects the meaning of a
situation might have for participants’ behavior, can occur without
them being consciously aware of it. As such, people are poor
describers of their own behavior, or the reasons for it. Perhaps
most famously, Nisbett and Wilson’s (1977) review supporting
the idea that people have little to no insight into the causes and
influences on their own behavior drove home just how poor a
source of data individual’s self-report is when we are interested in
understanding their actions. Not only does it seem that we do not
accurately experience the causes of our actions, but we are happy
to invent reasons or explanations that bear little relation to what
those real influences are.
Johansson et al.’s (2005) instant classic work on “choice
blindness” more recently illustrated just how quickly we can
produce such confabulations. Participants, when asked to choose
the more attractive between two photographs, and then asked
to explain their decision after being handed the wrong photo
still offered reasons, some mentioning unique aspects of the
new (unchosen) picture. Later work showed these confabulated
justifications for events to be insensitive to what actually
happened (Johansson et al., 2006).
Relatedly, Marcel’s (1993) work on multiple modes of response
indicates that we can simultaneously be conscious of a stimulus
in one response modality but not in another. That is, if asked
to speak a response or press a button, the same stimulus might
be simultaneously in a person’s experience and not. Experience,
whatever it might be, cannot be understood as a single, simple
stream of thought tightly bound to our behavior (Dennett, 1991).
Work in the neuroscience of vision seems to compound
this distinction between experience and action through the
identification of two apparently quite separate streams of visual
processing in the brain (Milner and Goodale, 1995; Goodale
and Milner, 2005). One, the dorsal stream, seems specialized
for the coordination of visuo-motor action, enabling a person
to engage effectively with objects through visual cues. The
other, ventral stream, appears to process the visual awareness
of objects, dealing with object recognition and naming. Various
forms of so-called “blindsight” illustrate the dissociation between
these two streams, where a person’s experience can partially
or dramatically disrupted while their actions remain effective
(Milner and Goodale, 1995).
The consistent trend throughout research on consciousness
and behavior is that the linkage between these two aspects
of psychology is not straightforward. Understanding that
relationship will not come from any casual introspection or
direct insight from people reporting what they think. In the
existing research the tendency is to explore people’s awareness
of their own actions, the reasons for those actions, or in the
case of the likes of Marcel’s work, their responses to minimally
relevant stimuli – that is images or sounds that only matter
to the participant within the constraints of the research task.
To that extent the research has tended to focus either on a
person’s already conceptualized, considered experience – their
metacognitive awareness of their thought and actions – or on tasks
that are stripped of meaningful context for people and therefore
do not fit easily within their normal range of behavior or their
normal experiences.
The recent rise in interest concerning context, experience and
meaning noted above (see e.g., Varela et al., 1991; Lutz, 2007;
Barrett et al., 2010; Mesquita, 2010; Schwarz, 2010; Froese et al.,
2011a,b) has criticized such pre-interpreted data. While we must
clearly be wary of the claims about their experience and their
behavior that we elicit from our participants, there might still be
important information we should collect from them about the
experience itself. These recent trends lean toward including the
analysis of some form of “raw” experience in the interpretation
of behavioral data, and perhaps the interrogation of variability
within those data. The existing research makes it clear that there
is a strong relationship between the participant’s experience, what
the situation means to them, and their behavior. It is equally clear
that this relationship, however, strong, is complicated. There is
no tight coupling between how a person experiences a situation
or stimulus, and the fine-grained details of their behaviors in
response.
That the existing research leaves us in such a state of confusion
suggests that the manner in which we have been collecting data
concerning experience is limited, and that other methods are
required. We must be careful and nuanced in our gathering and
interpreting of experiential reports. While people may provide
poor explanations for their actions, their reports of just what
they experienced may nevertheless hold valuable information for
psychological researchers. Over the past two decades a number
of different research methods have developed that may improve
matters. We argue that while these methods certainly advance the
science of the relationship between experience and action, and
can therefore help explore some of the issues regarding variability
in behavior on the basis of the meaning of the laboratory situation
for the participant, there remains room for refinement.
NEWER TECHNIQUES FOR THE STUDY
OF EXPERIENCE: WIDE AND NARROW
APPROACHES
Different approaches to studying experience come with different
commitments to levels of analysis, timescales of measurement,
and quality of information regarding the person’s activity at the
time of the experience being examined. Some methods, which
we will here term ‘wide’ approaches to experience, gather reports
or observations in a manner that involves less structure or
deliberation with regards to the activity in which the person is
engaged at the time, but tends to maximize the range of possible
responses and is often captured in ecologically relevant activities.
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Examples of such wide approaches are most standard
qualitative research methods in psychology, such as interviewing
or focus groups (Banister, 2011), the bottom-up explorations
of interpretative phenomenological analysis (Reid et al., 2005;
Palmer et al., 2010), and descriptive experience sampling (DES;
Hurlburt and Heavey, 2002; Hurlburt et al., 2002; Hurlburt and
Akhter, 2006), with its randomized triggering of introspective
episodes.
Wide approaches gather less constrained information, and
in doing so enable a broader exploration of possible research
questions. While it is possible to explore the relationship between
experience and actions with these methods, this tends to produce
a high level, low-resolution picture. These kinds of analyses are
useful in pointing us in the direction of more specific research
questions, and identifying broader patterns that are difficult if not
impossible to see using more narrowly focused methods.
Interviewing and focus groups, for instance, allow us to
explore people’s concepts of what they are doing, or how
they understand the situation in which they find themselves
(Banister, 2011). When participants’ understanding is our key
point of interest, this is valid. However, where our interest is in
understanding the specifics of the relationship between actions
and behavior, things break down, as the classic work on this issue
in experimental studies has shown.
Intepretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) is modest in its
aims in that it eschews claims to produce facts or unbiased data,
but notes that most people are not naive in their experiences –
they are experts, or at least familiar with the kinds of situations
in which they typically find themselves (Reid et al., 2005).
In partnership with a researcher people can reflect upon and
interpret their experience using all of the richness of history and
context that they bring to the situation, enabling the exploration
of certain kinds of relationships unavailable to many more
mainstream research techniques. The data typically collected
for IPA are interview transcripts, and as such depend on the
participants’ recollection for the event or events being examined.
Where the particular coupling of experience and behavior is of
interest, there are quite strong limits on what kind of insights this
form of analysis will enable.
Descriptive experience sampling aims to access “pristine”
(Hurlburt and Akhter, 2006) experience, relying less on
retrospective accounts of an experience, more on notes and
recorded comments made in the moments immediately following
an instant of experience, prompted by a beeper device or
similar trigger. The pristine nature of the experience – that
it is within the flow of the person’s natural activity, sampled
without much warning by a randomly occurring trigger – is at
the heart of the method’s intended use. Random sampling, and
the uncontrolled character of the environment mean that the
possibility of associating experiences with particular behaviors is
once again limited (though not entirely ruled out, see Hurlburt
et al., 2002).
Wide approaches to the study of experience are open to
the flow of experience and behavior within naturally occurring
activity. In approaches that are both qualitative and mixed
methods, these techniques have been applied in domains such
as Nursing (e.g., Traylen, unpublished MPhil dissertation),
Education (e.g., Onwuegbuzie et al., 2007; Palak and Walls,
2009), Anthropology (e.g., Killick, 1998), as well as Psychology
(e.g., Hurlburt and Akhter, 2006). They offer useful insights
into the relationship between experience and behavior, and
can be used to help structure sequential mixed methods
research projects where concepts and experiences are sampled
in ecologically rich settings and then variables identified for
closer inspection in laboratory experiments. For the more fine-
grained examination of specific variability of behavior in those
experiments, however, these approaches tend to be too broad,
examining timescales that are too long to adequately sample
experience at the grain of analysis that the behavior is being
measured.
“Narrow” approaches, on the other hand, focus more
particularly at the level of momentary experience and momentary
behaviors. In a sense, the entire domain of psychophysics
exists at this level of analysis, a very longstanding and finely
tuned examination of the relationship between physical stimuli
and a person’s experience of them. A somewhat related but
distinct precedent in the methodological literature is that of
systematic observation (Hintze et al., 2002; Podsakoff et al.,
2003). Systematic observation, with a long history in various
disciplines, clearly specifies the behaviors of interest in advance
and observes them (and only them) in naturalistic settings. It
therefore constitutes as more focused form of observation than
the “wide” approaches outlined above. The technique tends not
to involve the sampling of participants’ experience or awareness
of their surroundings at the moment of interest, however,
and the measurements of behavior while specific, are typically
more coarsely grained than would be common in controlled
experiments (though this may change as technology advances).
In the present paper, our interest is specifically with
the experience-behavior relationship, and how variability in
experience might be used to better understand variability in
measured behaviors. For that purpose we find two candidate
approaches in recently developed methods for fine-grained
experiential data collection: neurophenomenology (Varela, 1999;
Lutz and Thompson, 2003; Thompson et al., 2005) and the
elicitation interview (Petitmengin, 2006; Petitmengin et al.,
2013).
Both neurophenomenology and the elicitation interview
involve quite substantial control over the environment in which
that data are collected. In the case of neurophenomenology
the research is conducted in a neuroscience laboratory, usually
with EEG recording, and involves the careful training of
participants in phenomenological introspective techniques (that
is, introspection that attempts to avoid conceptualisation of
the experience, but to review and report it in as close to an
atheoretical fashion as possible). Neurophenomenology is thus an
example of a mixed methods approach (Tashakkori and Teddlie,
2010; Creswell and Plano Clark, 2011), seeking calibration of
quantitative measures with qualitative reports. The elicitation
interview is similarly conducted in a controlled setting, but in this
case the participant is not trained to introspect but interviewed
by a specialist in a manner intended to evoke the experience
of a particular moment, as opposed to some particular post hoc
understanding of that moment.
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Being lab-based, both neurophenomenology and the
elicitation interview offer the possibility of linking experience
with reliably, and finely, measured behaviors. They provide the
possibility of a high resolution examination of the relationship
between experience and action. They are not, of course, without
their drawbacks.
Neurophenomenology requires training of participants in the
particular introspective techniques associated, and in doing so
alters the very experience we are studying. Lutz and Thompson
(2003) argue that this is not a deep problem, though do not offer
a full explanation as to why. While it is quite possibly true that
coming to an understanding of experience will necessarily change
it, we would argue that methods should still be explored that
might possibly provide us with naive or unreflective experiential
reports. We do not argue against neurophenomenology, but
simply note that there may yet be useful experiential data to
collect from participants whose reports are not pre-disciplined
by the training they have received. Neurophenomenology is one
tool available to us, we note that others are yet needed.
The elicitation interview purports to provide just such naive
data, and in this we see real promise, but two facets of the
technique imply limits that might still leave us with an important
methodological blindspot.
The collaboratively constructed nature of the interview
process is one point of consideration, keenly aware as we already
are about the ease with which apparently confabulated responses
about experiential reports are produced. While proponents of
the elicitation interview approach argue strongly that a properly
skilled interviewer neither foists particular descriptions nor
prompts invented reports from their interviewees (Petitmengin,
2006), we must yet proceed with care. This means that the
approach, while both demanding of extraordinary discipline on
the part of the interviewer and substantial time for its conduct
(often between half an hour to an hour per interview), must
still be used with caution. Such pragmatic considerations must
not stop us from doing good science, but they do, nevertheless,
motivate us to be fully cognisant of the range of choices we have
available.
More concerning for our current purposes is the standard
focus of the elicitation interview: the re-evocation of a particular
moment of experience, an instant, as it were, during which a
decision was made, or a response to a question as it popped into
the interviewee’s mind. The techniques of the interview bring
the participant back to that moment, as though it were as real
and rich as their immediate environment. With the previous
experience thus being relived, it can be interrogated in fine
detail. In doing so, however, the temporal relationship between
event and subsequent discussion is broken. In Petitmengin et al.’s
(2013) recent study on the Johansson et al. ’s (2005, 2006) choice
blindness task, for instance, some participants completed the
photo choice and explanation at the normal pace, with reports on
the decision occurring between 5 s and 1 min after the choice.
The elicitation interview involved a period of between 30 and
45 min post-decision before re-presentation of the photo and
evoking of explanation. It is very likely that the collection of
systematic experiential reports of any kind is going to involve
the interruption of the flow of behavior within a task in some
form. We would argue, however, that more modest interruptions
should be more attractive, and where possible the temporal
dimensions of the task should be carefully balanced across
participant groups. What is more important, however, is the
possibility of multiple sampling points throughout the course of
a task. Where highly focused techniques such as the elicitation
interview provide fine-grained examination of a single moment,
there is not only a possibility but some suggestive evidence of
multiple strands of experience, and multiple rhythms of attention
or endogenous sensitivity to different aspects of the environment
operating over different timescales (Varela et al., 1981; Donald,
2001; Busch et al., 2009). That is, our experience is not just a string
of beads, but has multiple tempos and currents to it that will need
multiple sampling to observe, a form of repeated probing that the
likes of the elicitation interview makes unfeasible.
We therefore argue that there is room between the wide
and narrow forms of investigation of experience for a set
of intermediate methods. This intermediate range is more
anchored in recorded events and actions than wide approaches.
Such an approach will enable it to be used within controlled
environments, and thus offers promise in collecting data relevant
to the interrogation of variable behavior in controlled settings.
The approach would also, though, be less finely coupled to
particular stimuli or instants of experience than the more narrow
approaches. The meaningfulness of actions is to be sampled
at this intermediate range, where we might find patterns of
behavior rather than individual events, and themes of experience
rather than fine-grained particulars. Instead of the fast, very
short durations of most neural events as measured and used
in neurophenomenology, we might explore the slower, 10s of
seconds or minutes of duration in common behavior settings.
Given the history of research on experience-behavior links, we
might expect relationships between sampled experience and
behavior to need this kind of re-sampling, so that variability in
behavior can be calibrated against variability in experience, rather
than trying to capture something fixed in either one.
SUGGESTING AN INTERMEDIATE LEVEL
OF ANALYSIS
While dependencies of behavior on a host of contextual factors
is violated in laboratory experiments, this is a compromise
adopted for the purposes of maximizing communicability
(through standardized meanings to terms and procedures) as
well as replicability [an issue of some current concern amongst
researchers (Koole and Lakens, 2012; Nosek et al., 2012; Open
Science Collaboration, 2012, 2015; Ritchie et al., 2012; Roediger,
2012)].
Long running debates over the value of lab vs. field research
are essentially the professional policing of this compromise,
an exercise in maintaining perspective on the complementary
values of different forms of data collection, and an effort at
continually refining and improving our methods. The collection
of reports of the experiences of participants is no exception to this
issue, with wider approaches serving richer understandings of
context, while the more narrowly focused techniques offer higher
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resolution accounts of more finely circumscribed phenomena.
Wide approaches explore the general attitudes and experiences of
a person at a conceptual level that fits the person’s understanding
of their situation and actions, but that makes specific reference
to particular experiences and behaviors challenging. Narrow
approaches, on the other hand, may in fact be swamping the
signal on the relationship between experience and behavior
with the noise of momentary stream of consciousness, much
of which is irrelevant to the niceties of bodily action (Aglioti
et al., 1995; Milner and Goodale, 1995). If the meaning of the
situation (as suggested by the likes of Barrett et al., 2010), rather
than strings of isolated stimuli, are part of what matter to the
structuring of behavior, and the variability of measurements
around a mean for a given behavioral variable, then at least
some of the varied methods we use should be calibrated at that
appropriate scale.
Without knowing what experiential data most matter for
best understanding behavior, the wise course of action is to
sample widely and often, but within a setting where the
behavior is sufficiently reliable to keep subtle relationships
stable (or as stable as they can be). We suggest a form
of controlled descriptive experience sampling (a “C-DES”),
where introspective moments are triggered as with standard
DES – without prior warning to the participant, via a beep
or flash, perhaps. The participants might understand these
triggers to be random, but they need not be in actuality.
Descriptions can be kept brief, to potentiate multiple such
sampling during a single task or event as appropriate. Further,
the purely verbal descriptions of standard DES might also
be augmented with simple video recording of non-verbal
behaviors such as blinks, eye-movements, or other possibly
subtle, aspects of the participant’s behavior, offering a richer
interpretative context for the content of reports (Olivares et al.,
2015).
To offer an illustration, the Iowa Gambling Task (Bechara
et al., 1994) is a frequently used laboratory activity conducted to
evaluate participants’ sensitivity to certain kinds of consequences,
or to investigate trait characteristics such as impulsivity or
executive control. The task is sometimes augmented with
questions to the participant about their knowledge of its various
components, to see how this changes over the course of
the activity. Just what the relationship between participants’
knowledge and their behavior is over the course of the task is
somewhat problematic, but C-DES would eschew a need for the
participant to understand the task at all, or report knowledge of
it. Rather, by sampling what they were aware of either at key
moments, or at regular intervals over the course of the task,
researchers might be able to explore this relationship without
relying on participant insight.
While this runs counter to the standard use of DES, for
which naturalistic activity is vital, many of the strengths of
the approach are maintained (no pre-specification or priming
of behavior or moment to be introspected upon, naturalistic
description of experience by participants). These strengths might
thus be deployed in the service of understanding people’s
experiences of the laboratory during the laboratory task, and
provide one of several perspectives from which we build up a
richer understanding of what people are doing, and how they are
experiencing the doing of it.
We will not know without conducting the research what
kinds of experience will be relevant. History indicates clearly that
introspective explanations of behavior are not the data we are
looking for, but a plethora of other options are available, across
numerous scales of time. Sensory experiences, physiological
rhythms and responses, emotions, moods, culturally relevant
routines – these things, and more show up in people’s descriptions
of their experience. While long-practiced habits might primarily
shape behavior at the level of momentary particulars, experience
may instead be coupled with action at the level of “molar
behavior” (Barker, 1968).
This is to say that experience may not be a flow of
individual moments in continuous accumulation, but a general
awareness of a situation within which various relationships
become distinguished – an event does not simply happen at
some psychological “now”, but early or late within a general
expectation or understanding of the setting. Longstanding (but
little known) work indicates that people are very sensitive to the
standing patterns of behavior or expected routine present within
a given physical or social setting (Barker, 1968; Schoggen, 1989;
Heft, 2001, 2003, 2007; see also Heft et al., 2014, for a recent
examination of people’s ability to recognize settings with very
limited information). The work of Mesquita (2010) and Barrett
et al. (2011, 2014), have shown a similarly situational character to
people’s emotional reactions.
Within a more controlled form of DES the probing of
conscious awareness can remain open and largely unstructured.
Participants are free to describe their experience in familiar
and comfortable terms, which can be explicated in conversation
with the experimenter either immediately, or at a later time
after the experimental task itself is completed. For the main,
the standard DES principles outlined by Hurlburt et al. (2002)
apply. The time between experience reporting and exploration
in collaboration with the researcher is very short. Moments of
experience are clearly defined (by the use of a tone or other
trigger). Various practices of the interview are used to ensure that
careful distinctions are made between the experience itself and
any attempt to explain that experience.
In addition, however, given that the initial probings of
experience can be kept brief (or varied in length depending
on research goals), the possibility of multiple samplings over
the course of a single experimental session is maintained. The
intervals between samplings can be used as a means of exploring
the temporal aspects of experience, its rhythms, and periodic
variations.
USING THE UN-MEAN-ABLE TO
CALIBRATION THE MEAN (AND
VICE-VERSA)
Focusing closely on averages as summaries of collections of data
is a practice that depends on a host of background theoretical
assumptions. Speelman and McGann (2013) raised concerns
(oft-noted in statistics courses, but rarely applied in practice) that
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these assumptions are commonly unquestioned, and frequently
ill-considered. While there are some reporting and analysis
practices that might help contextualize the mean in mathematical
or statistical terms, and we support calls to move toward
standardizing such practices (such as Doherty et al., 2013), it
is equally important to query the psychological, and not just
statistical, context to the data being collected.
In this paper we have argued that there are good reasons for
paying more attention than we typically do to the experience
of the participant within rigorous laboratory experiments. There
is clearly a relationship between participants’ experiences of a
given situation and their behavior within that situation, but the
relationship is not a simple one. The validity of our measures, and
relatedly our understanding of their variation, must be achieved
through the coordination of multiple sources of knowledge about
a person and their actions in a given setting. Experiential data,
however, challenging they are to work with, have some role to
play in that validation and calibration process (Froese et al.,
2011a).
What we have termed “wide” approaches to such experiential
data collection do not provide us with the behavioral data at
the level of detail we need to effect this calibration. Conversely,
the approaches we have termed “narrow” we suggest are too
narrow. Though they enable the collection of specific behavioral
data, the pre-focused nature of their experience sampling imposes
expectations or prior understandings of the kinds of experience
we need to probe, and include assumptions about the momentary
nature of those experiences, that are inappropriate for our current
levels of understanding (or perhaps more accurately, ignorance),
about the behavior-experience relationship, particularly of the
varying timescales of different phenomena of consciousness.
We propose that a C-DES is a data collection technique ideal
for the kinds of disciplined exploratory research that is needed
to adequately observe the experience-behavior relationship. In
order to determine to what degree a calculated mean actually
matters to what people do, and how to refine the validity of
what it measures, we need a level of description and analysis
of experiential data that is not commonly in use – one that is
exploratory and potentially wide-ranging, but evoked within a
controlled, managed situation such as the laboratory experiment.
The paired examination of controlled behaviors still offers us
a means of understanding and interpreting the descriptions of
experiences captured through this process. The validation of the
mean and the un-meanable is a two-way relationship, achieved
not through a single ideal study, but through a long process of
negotiation across multiple studies, using multiple methods.
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